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Abstract
War creates a huge need for labour to support the war efforts of the belligerent parties.
In South Africa tens of thousands of ‘non-white’ workers were mobilised during the
Second World War to satisfy the Union Defence Force’s (UDF’s) labour needs at home
and abroad.  This article, firstly, outlines the role of ‘non-white people’, particularly
black Africans, in the UDF with special reference to those employed within the Union of
South Africa.  Secondly, it briefly delineates typhoid fever as an historical thorn in the
flesh of military forces up to the early 20th century.  It then looks briefly into the
incidence of and perceptions on typhoid fever as a killer disease in South Africa on the
eve of the Second World War.  Against that background, the article investigates the
employment of black workers on the construction of the Berg River-Saldanha Bay
military water pipeline and the UDF’s response to the threat and subsequent outbreak
of typhoid fever amongst the workers at the Berg River intake site in 1943.  The article
concludes that the public health authorities and UDF were aware of the threat of typhoid
fever with regard to the Berg River water scheme, but did not take sufficient precautionary
measures, which could have had serious repercussions for the Allied war effort.  This
incident should serve as a warning to the South African National Defence Force when
deploying on peace support operations on the African continent where typhoid fever
remains a serious threat next to Hiv/Aids.
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Introduction
War creates a huge need for labour to support the war efforts of the
belligerent parties, both in the various theatres of war and at the home
front, be it to erect fortifications, transport military equipment and
supplies, manufacture war materials or creating infrastructure.  In
South Africa tens of thousands of blacks, so-called coloureds and
Asians (Indian-Malay) were mobilised in and out of uniform during
the Second World War (1939-1945) to satisfy the Union Defence
Force’s (UDF’s) labour needs.  The aim of this article is to determine
the causes, course, and consequences of the outbreak of typhoid fever
amongst the UDF’s black workers at the Berg River pump station in
1943 against the backdrop of the historical threat of that disease to
the military, as well as the working conditions of the UDF’s black
workers during the Second World War.  The article, firstly, outlines
the role and circumstances of ‘non-white’ people, particularly black
Africans, in the UDF with special reference to those employed within
the Union of South Africa as civilian workers.  Secondly, it briefly
looks into the incidence of and perceptions on typhoid fever as a
killer disease in South Africa on the eve of the Second World War
and the way in which the UDF dealt with the threat of the disease
amongst its black workers.  Against that background, the article
investigates the employment of black workers on the construction of
the Berg River-Saldanha Bay military water pipeline and evaluates
the UDF’s response to the threat and subsequent outbreak of typhoid
fever amongst its black workers at the Berg River intake site in May
1943.  In conclusion, the article seeks to indicate the relevance of the
Berg River incident to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
when deploying on peace support missions on the African continent.
The role of black South African workers in World War II
The South African Defence Act of 1912 had entrenched racial
discrimination in the military as it stipulated that the liability to
render military service in peace and war ‘shall not be enforced against
persons not of European descent unless and until Parliament shall
by resolution determine the extent to which and conditions under
which any such liability shall be enforced against such persons.1   It
stipulated further, however, that nothing would prevent ‘the voluntary
engagement at any time of such persons for service in any portion of
the Defence Forces in such capacities and under such conditions as
are prescribed’.2   In practice, this meant that blacks, so-called




coloureds and Asians (Indian-Malay) were destined for inferior roles,
being allowed to sign up for tedious supportive and unskilled roles
only, both in uniform and as civilians.  Thousands of these people of
colour served as construction and other workers, guards, drivers,
stretcher-bearers, cooks, orderlies, clerks and similar, non-combatant
roles during the Second World War.3
Three ‘Non-European’ military units, namely the Native Military Corps,
the Cape Corps (comprising of so-called ‘coloureds’) and the Indian-
Malay Corps were raised in the Union during the Second World War
through the agency of the Native Affairs Department and the
Directorate Non-European Army Services.4   The mobilisation and
recruitment of ‘Non-Europeans’, particularly blacks, was riddled with
controversies premised on paternalistic and racial prejudice which
drove policy decisions in the country.  Firstly, the question of blacks
taking part in a ‘white men’s war’ and secondly, the issue of them
carrying ‘precision arms’ produced negative reactions from the
majority of whites.5   The military authorities, taking cognisance of
the practicalities of the war, knew that it made sense to recruit from
the black population because whites were in a minority and inevitably
their military expertise would be immediately needed in combat zones
at the frontlines.  And, a significant part of the white population,
particularly the Afrikaans-speaking section, refused to participate
in the war.  However, the political implications of even arming blacks
were too great; hence the ‘compromise’ of recruiting blacks to serve
mostly in inferior roles as labourers, and not as combat soldiers.  South
African Prime Minister, General J.C. Smuts, made the position of
blacks that actually served in uniform clear in 1940 when he stated
that
in order to forestall misrepresentation and prevent possible
misunderstanding, it is to be clearly understood that natives will
not … be equipped with arms of precision.6
Another factor related to the recruitment of blacks was the question
of the adequacy of the available labour pool.  The 1936 census put
the black male population of the Union between the ages of 18 and
45 at 1 539 758, which, according to Grundlingh, had risen to about
3 I. Gleeson, The Unknown Force: Black, Indian and Coloured Soldiers Through Two
World Wars (Ashanti, Rivonia, 1994), p ix.
4 See L.W.F. Grundlingh, The Participation of the South African Blacks in the
Second World War (D. Litt. et Phil. Thesis, RAU, 1986), and I Gleeson, The
Unknown Force.
5 L.W.F. Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks in the Second
World War, pp 18-20.
6 As quoted in Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks in the Second
World War, p 23.
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1 600 000 at the outbreak of the Second World War.7   Agriculture
and industry employed about 1 000 000 men, leaving some 600 000
that could be mobilised for military service.8   It was, furthermore,
estimated that about 4 000 - 5 000 male urban blacks in
Johannesburg alone were unemployed and many others who were
reluctant to be employed in mine or on farms, could be available for
recruitment.  Although the objective number of blacks to be recruited
vacillated with changing fortunes of the Allied forces, approximately
80 000 ultimately served during the war in uniform or as civilian
workers.  The majority of these men came from rural South Africa,
contrary to the “interests” of the authorities who preferred urban
blacks because of their experiences in skilled employment such as
construction, industries and mines, as well as some degree of literacy.
Hence the first recruiting initiatives targeted township beer halls,
eating halls, cinemas, clubs, schools, trams, buses and trains.9
However, after the fall of Tobruk in June 1942, recruitment procedures
were reorganised to draw more people from the rural areas where the
local chiefs were used as agents.10
Most of the black men who found employment as civilian labourers
in the UDF, like their compatriots in uniform, were compelled by lack
of job opportunities in the urban areas and poor economic conditions
in the rural areas resulting from droughts and other natural disasters
such as ‘army worms’.  Poor health amongst some of these men could
be ascribed to structural factors such as poor socio-economic
conditions and lack of access to adequate health care facilities.
Compounding this problem was the conditions under which blacks
lived and worked in the UDF.11
The service conditions of black workers in the UDF, as in other
employment sectors in the Union, were poor.  Compared to white
people, their wages were extremely low, while their food and
accommodation was of poor quality.  Blacks were fed on dry bread at
times, and due to the lack of appropriate cooking facilities and messes
7 L.W.F.Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks in the Second World
War, pp 23, 54.
8 Ibid.
9 South African National Defence Force Archives (hereafter SANDFA), NMC 5, NAS3/
4/20/1, ‘Native Military Corps Recruiting: Progress Report for period 10/1/43 to
23/1/43.
10 Ibid.
11 L.W.F. Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks in the Second
World War, p 138; M. Roth, “If you give us rights we will fight”: Black Involvement
in the Second World War, South African Historical Journal (No. 15), November 1983,
pp 85-104. This article highlights some of the laborious non-military tasks such
as mining salt, carting maize and extracting rubber, which were performed by
the Native Military Corps in adverse conditions inside the Union and they were
also exposed to diseases such as malaria.
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as opposed to whites, they were sometimes forced to cook and eat out
in the open.12   The accommodation comprised in most cases of mining
compounds, bungalows and tents.13   Grundlingh paints a dreadful
picture of the abysmal conditions for blacks in various military camps.
At the Congella camp, for example, open timber sheds were closed
with corrugated iron with no doors, windows or floors.14   The tents
for blacks were poorly sited as they were either flooded during rainy
seasons or too dusty in dry periods, resulting in extreme health
hazards.  The whites, on the other hand, had weatherproof tents.  The
black camps were also overcrowded, while in some cases servicemen
slept on concrete floors; the roofs were leaking; ablution and sanitary
facilities were in a poor state, sometimes with no running water.15   Hence,
under these circumstances, hygiene was massively perilous, creating
favourable conditions for a plethora of diseases, including typhoid fever.
Typhoid fever: the ‘poor man’s burden’ and the soldier’s
deadly companion
Enteric fever, specifically Typhoid fever, the ‘typical form of enteric
fever’,16  has historically been a great destroyer of human life and it is
estimated that even today, despite huge advances in health care
globally, up to 22 million people contract the disease worldwide every
year, of whom about 200 000 die. Typhoid fever is defined as an ‘acute
infectious disease caused by a specific serotype of the bacterium
Salmonella typhi.17  This bacterium lives in humans only and enters
the body through the mouth by the intake of contaminated food or
water. It penetrates the intestinal wall and multiplies in lymphoid
tissue, entering into the bloodstream within 24 to 72 hours after
infection, causing septicaemia (blood poisoning) and systemic
infection. The early symptoms of typhoid are headache, malaise,
generalized aching, fever and restlessness, which appear after an
incubation period of ten to fourteen days. Patients may also
experience a loss of appetite, nosebleeding, coughing and diarrhoea
or constipation. They develop a persistent, gradually rising fever
peaking at about 40°C and after about two weeks of fever, serious
complications such as internal bleeding, acute inflammation of the
12 L.W.F. Grundlingh, The participation of South African Blacks in the Second
World War, p 138.
13 Ibid, p 139.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 P. Kumar and M. Clark, Clinical Medicine, 5th ed (WB Saunders, Edinburgh, etc,
2002), p 88.
17 Encyclopædia Britannica, “Typhoid fever”, Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008 Ultimate
Reference Suite (Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, 2009).
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gallbladder, heart failure, pneumonia, osteomyelitis, encephalitis,
and meningitis may develop.  Continued high fever may also lead to
mental confusion and delirium.  The fever normally starts declining,
in favourable cases, by about the fourth week, whereupon the
symptoms begin to abate.  Without treatment, the sickness thus lasts
for three to four weeks and between 12 and 30 per cent of those
infected will die, while about 10 per cent of the survivors will have
relapses.  Infected people carry the bacteria in their bloodstream and
intestinal tract.  About 5-10 per cent of people who recover from
typhoid fever, called carriers, continue to shed Salmonella typhi in
their faeces for several months and 1-4 per cent continue to carry
the organism for more than a year.  Antimicrobial treatment shortens
the duration of the illness and reduces fatalities.18
Most epidemical outbreaks of typhoid are normally the result of the
public water supply or drinking water being polluted by human
excreta.  This killer disease therefore affects mostly vulnerable groups
of overcrowded, poverty-stricken communities, especially in the
developing world, because outbreaks are facilitated by poor socio-
economic conditions where hygiene is generally low, handwashing
is infrequent and ineffective sanitation systems often result in the
contamination of drinking water with raw sewage.19   An outbreak
can of course also result from food and milk being contaminated by
a carrier of the disease who is involved the in handling and processing
such commodities.  Second to human contact in spreading typhoid,
are house flies in a situation where there is ‘an abundance of fly-
breeding material’ and the flies have access to typhoid-infected
human faeces.20   Other possible causes are contaminated dust, fresh
vegetables grown on soil fertilized or polluted by raw sewage and the
use of polluted water for cleaning purposes.21   Outbreaks of typhoid
fever are consequently best prevented through proper sewage
18 P. Kumar and M. Clark, Clinical Medicine, 5th ed (WB Saunders, Edinburgh, etc,
2002), p 88; Encyclopædia Britannica, “Typhoid fever”, Encyclopaedia Britannica
2008 Ultimate Reference Suite (Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, 2009); http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/typhoidfever_g.htm, accessed 6 July
2007; http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/typhoidfever_t.htm,
accessed 6 July 2007; http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/yellowBookCh4-
Typhoid.aspx, accessed 6 July 2007.
19 http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/typhoidfever_g.htm, accessed 6
July 2007; http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/typhoidfever_t.htm,
accessed 6 July 2007; http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/yellowBookCh4-
Typhoid.aspx, accessed 6 July 2007; P. Kumar and M. Clark, Clinical Medicine,
p 88.
20 See V.J. Cirillo, “ ‘Winged Sponges’: Houseflies as Carriers of Typhoid Fever in
19th- and Early 20th-Century Military Camps”, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
49 (1), Winter 2006, pp 52 - 63.
21 Encyclopædia Britannica, “Typhoid fever”, Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008 Ultimate
Reference Suite (Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, 2009).
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treatment, filtration and chlorination of water and the exclusion of
carriers from employment in the food industry and restaurants.
Prophylactic vaccination was introduced in the early 20th century,
but none of the available vaccines is completely effective.22
Typhoid fever was one of the 19th century’s deadliest diseases,
especially in densely populated urban areas.  As a killer disease, it
was in a sense comparable to the situation with regard to HIV/Aids
today, if not in terms of incidence, then at least in terms of the fear
factor regarding public health.23   Although it declined with the
improvement of urban sanitation systems, it remained a considerable
public health threat.24   War always produce ‘high risk situations25
which accelerates ‘spatial transmission and rate of [epidemic disease]
propagation’26  because of the prevalence of mixing of various groups
from different backgrounds.  The huge concentration of people and
the frequent absence of adequate sanitation and water purification
measures in the field during military campaigns made armies also
particularly vulnerable to typhoid fever.  It is thus no great surprise
that when prophylactic vaccination against typhoid fever was first
introduced at the beginning of the 20th century, it was primarily in
military forces and institutions.27   Disease had, as Gabriel and Metz
put it,
ever since the dawn of warfare… carried off more soldiers than
enemy weapons… [and] more combat power was lost to armies by
temporary disablement due to illness than to any other cause.28
John Keegan observes that in earlier times
the threat of epidemic disease accompanied armies wherever they
moved, and the outbreak of disease – cholera, dysentery, typhoid,
plague – remained the greatest killer of soldiers until the very
recent past.  Armies acted also as principal disease carriers, and
their pestilence was one of the reasons why settled peoples so
often fled their homes when an army passed by or, more
menacingly, pitched camp.  Armies that campaigned across disease
22 Ibid.
23 J.W. Leavitt, Typhoid Mary: Captive to the Public’s Health (Beacon Press, Boston,
1996), pp 2, 4, 21.
24 J.W. Leavitt, Typhoid Mary: Captive to the Public’s Health (Beacon Press, Boston,
1996), pp 9, 21.
25 S. Marks, “An Epidemic Waiting to Happen? The Spread of HIV/AIDS in South
Africa in Social and Historical Perspective, African Studies, 62 (1), 2002, pp 14-
15, 17.
26 M. Smallman-Raynor and A.D. Cliff, “The spatial dynamics of epidemic diseases
in war and peace: Cuba and the insurrection against Spain, 1895-98”, Transactions
of the Institute of British Geographers 24 (3), pp 331-352.
27 Encyclopædia Britannica, “Typhoid fever”.
28 R.A. Gabriel and K.S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine II: From the Renaissance
through Modern Times (Greenwood Press, New York, etc, 1992), p 66.
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barriers… exposed themselves to sicknesses against which they
had acquired no immunity; they might equally carry with them the
agents of disease that would destroy a local population without
firing a shot in anger.29
Typhoid fever, dubbed by Cirillo ‘the scourge of 19th- and 20th-century
armies’30  always took a heavy toll on military campaigns.  Besides
human contact, flies contributed greatly to this state of affairs.  Horses
played a critical role in the armies of the day and the ever-present
piles of horse manure in military camps provided excellent fly-
breeding sites, while pit latrines afforded the flies a rich source of
typhoid-infected human faeces.31   Sir William Osler, Regius Professor
of Medicine at Oxford University, stated in July 1916:
(T)yphoid fever… in nearly every great war had been an enemy as
formidable as the bullet… it was above all other diseases the most
fatal…an insidious enemy which… sapped the strength of the opposing
forces… Over and over again it killed thousands of soldiers before
they ever reached the firing line, while the deaths at the front were
appalling.32
Osler substantiated his claim with statistics from a few well-known
wars from the late-nineteenth to the early-twentieth century.  He
pointed out that during the American Civil War (1861 – 1865),
statistically ‘the most life-threatening war ever fought’33  and in which
three of every five Union deaths (and two of every three Confederate
deaths) resulted from disease,34  the Union Army alone suffered
79 455 cases of typhoid, of whom 29 336 died.  Subsequent research
revealed even more staggering figures.  Cirillo claims that the Union
army, out of mean strength of 1,5 million men, suffered 136 862 cases
of typhoid of whom 34 696 (25,3 per cent) died.35   In the Franco
Prussian War (1870 - 1871) some 8 000 Prussian soldiers died of
typhoid fever, representing 60 per cent of all their war deaths.  During
the Spanish-American War (1898) 20 738 out of 107 073 American
soldiers, almost 20%, contracted typhoid, of whom 1 380 died – all
within six months (June – November).  In the Second Anglo-Boer War
(1899 1902) the British, who deployed close to 500 000 troops in
29 J. Keegan “Foreword” in R.A. Gabriel and K.S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine
II, pp xi-xii.
30 V.J. Cirillo, “ ‘Winged Sponges’: Houseflies as Carriers of Typhoid Fever”, p 53.
31 Ibid, p 54.
32 Quoted in anon., “Osler Finds Nerves Chief War Problem: Typhoid Virtually
Conquered Through the Lessons Learned in Other Great Conflicts”, The New
York Times, 9 Julie 1916.  (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.html?res=9E04E0DF1E31E733A0575AC0A9619C946796D6CF, accessed
16 January 2008.)
33 R.A. Gabriel and K.S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine II, p 181.
34 Ibid.
35 V.J. Cirillo, “ ‘Winged Sponges’: Houseflies as Carriers of Typhoid Fever”, p 53.
Visser , Monama
189
South Africa, suffered 57 684 cases of typhoid, of which 19 454 were
invalided and 8 022 died.36   ‘More British soldiers, Osler claims, ‘were
lost from the bacilli of typhoid than from the bullets of the Boers’,37
which is not altogether an exaggeration, since a mere 5774 British
soldiers were killed in action, but one must add to that number just
over 2000 that died of wounds.38
Typhoid fever was indeed endemic in many parts of South Africa at
the time of the Anglo-Boer War. 39   It certainly caused many casualties
amongst the Boer commandos, but what stands out in South Africans’
memory, is how, in the much-quoted words of then British Liberal
Party leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, British ‘methods of
barbarism’40 , negligence and indifference cost tens of thousands of
South Africans’ lives, black and white, most of them women and
children, in Lord Kitchener’s infamous concentration camps.  The
majority of these deaths resulted from ‘epidemics of measles and
typhoid that could have been avoided’.41   In the white concentration
camp at Heilbron alone there were some 400 deaths a month by
November 1901 of which a large percentage were caused by typhoid.42
The situation was probably worse in black concentration camps given
the prevailing socio-structural and political conditions, but due to
poor British recordkeeping and the neglect of that aspect of the history
of the Anglo-Boer War, very little information is available for
evaluation.43
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 – 1905 was the first major war in
history in which more soldiers were killed by military action than by
disease.44   It was also during that war that medical personnel,
36 Anon., “Osler Finds Nerves Chief War Problem: Typhoid Virtually Conquered”;
See also V.J. Cirillo, “ ‘Winged Sponges’: Houseflies as Carriers of Typhoid Fever”,
p 53.  (Cirillo puts the mean strength of the US forces during the Spanish-
American War at 274 717 men, concurs with the figure of 20 738 cases of typhoid,
but claims that 1 590 of them died as opposed to the 1 380 mentioned by Osler.)
37 Quoted in anon., “Osler Finds Nerves Chief War Problem: Typhoid Virtually
Conquered”.
38 T. Pakenham, The Boer War (Abacus, London, 1992), p 572; R.A. Gabriel and K.S.
Metz, A History of Military Medicine II, p 223.  (According to Pakenham the total
British casualties amounted to some 22 000 men, of which 5 774 were killed in
action and 16 168 died of wounds and disease.  Gabriel and Metz put the number
of British killed in action at 6 000 and those killed by disease at 14 000.)
39 T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp 381-2, 149.
40 Ibid, pp 504, 508.
41 Ibid, p 518.
42 Ibid, p 516.
43 T. Pakenham, The Boer War, pp 510-18; 554, 573; P. Warwick, Black People and
the South African War, 1899 - 1902 (Longman, London and Ravan, Johannesburg,
1983), pp 149-51.
44 R.A. Gabriel and K.S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine II, p 226.
Typhoid fever and the construction of the Berg River
TD, 4(1), July 2008, pp. 181-208.
190
especially on the Japanese side, started making significant progress
in combating typhoid through a system of adequate sanitation and
the experimental inoculation of troops.  The Japanese achievements
in military medicine indeed ricochet around the globe and medical
officers from the Western world hurried off to Japan to share in their
knowledge.45   The Japanese progress was supported by work done by
the US Army, who created a Typhoid Board46  during the Spanish-
American War and also experimented with the inoculation of soldiers.47
These successes enabled armed forces to combat the disease
effectively right from the commencement of the First World War by
inoculating soldiers before they were sent to war.  Even though
inoculation was not compulsory in the British army and a small
minority of soldiers did not take that precaution, only 46 cases of
typhoid was reported in the British forces in France and England
over a period of one year in 1915/16.48
The German forces on the Western Front were equally successful in
fighting the disease,49  but the French medical services were poor and
they suffered 50 000 cases of typhoid during the first three years of
the war; almost all their water supplies were contaminated by
typhoid.50   On the Eastern Front medical care was even worse than
in the French Army and a high incidence of typhoid fever prevailed
amongst the Russian forces, as well as amongst forces in Austria-
Hungary, Turkey and Asia.51
Given the high incidence of typhoid in cases where proper preventive
measure were lacking, Osler correctly warned in 1916, that it still
‘require[d] constant work to protect enormous armies from the
ravages of typhus… the ease with which the typhoid germ may
spread through a camp necessitates constant watch.  A soldier on
active service may take typhoid with him, or he may contract it in
the country.  In a large body of men there will always be a certain
percentage “carriers” who may act as a focus of distribution… [and]
unless strict vigilance were observed… not alone in the use of
preventive serum… but in applying every precaution… to keep
camps and trenches clear of germ life… the percentage of mortality
would be stupendous’.52
45 Ibid; Anon., “Osler Finds Nerves Chief War Problem: Typhoid Virtually Conquered”.
46 V.J. Cirillo, “ ‘Winged Sponges’: Houseflies as Carriers of Typhoid Fever”, p 53.
47 Anon., “Osler Finds Nerves Chief War Problem: Typhoid Virtually Conquered”.
48 Ibid.
49 R.A. Gabriel and K.S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine II, p 244; Anon., “Osler
Finds Nerves Chief War Problem: Typhoid Virtually Conquered”.
50 R.A. Gabriel and K.S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine II, p 245.
51 Ibid, p 226; Anon., “Osler Finds Nerves Chief War Problem: Typhoid Virtually
Conquered”.




Thus, despite the astounding successes in reducing typhoid to ‘a
negligible factor’, it remains a threat to armed forces to this day if
proper countermeasures are not in place.
Amongst the twenty most prominent infectious diseases, including
pulmonary tuberculosis, diphtheria, scarlet fever and influenzal
pneumonia, typhoid fever was still a comparatively prevalent and
much-feared disease in South Africa by the outbreak of the Second
World War.53   In 1928, Dr James Alexander Mitchell, the Secretary
for Public Health published a circular titled, ‘Catechism about
Typhoid or Enteric Fever’, to each local authority and magistrate
in the Union to advice them on the prevalence and deadliness of
the disease as well as measures to contain it.54
This circular derived from the publication of the South African Red
Cross Society, ‘Typhoid or Enteric Fever’, with the approval of the
Union Department of Public Health, to highlight the causes, spread
and prevention of this disease in South Africa.55   Emphasis was
placed on the so-called ‘Three F’s – Fingers, Flies and Filth’, as
the key agents in the causes and spread of typhoid fever and how
these could be contained.56
Over a 16-year period up to 1939, some 3000 cases of typhoid fever
had been treated in Pretoria alone,57  and in the nearby mining town
of Benoni the incidence rate was 1,03 cases (all races) per thousand
of the population in 1937.  Four European children and 11 non-
Europeans died of the disease in Benoni in 1937.58   Given the fact
that typhoid fever was not a notifiable disease,59  and black people
often did not have ready access to medical services, many more could
have died from the disease; countrywide the numbers over that period
could have been quite significant.  From August 1939 to July 1946,
53 Pulmonary Tuberculosis was the highest killer with about 100-130 cases reported
monthly in Cape Town alone.  Other diseases included Diphtheria (20-30 cases),
Scarlet Fever (20), Cerebrospinal Fever (10-20), and Influenzal Pneumonia (20-
40).  National Archives of South Africa, Cape Town (hereafter NASAC), 3/CT, 1/
4/7/5/1/3 – 1/4/7/6/1/6, Public Health Committee Minutes, 1939-1946.
54 NASAC, 3/CT, 4/1/5/553, E1451/5, J. A. Mitchell, Secretary for Public Health,
pamphlet no. 365 (Health), circular no. 8 of 1928, 7 August 1928.
55 NASAC, 1/UTA, 6/1/17, 13/3/6 (old no, 13/8/3), South African Red Cross
Society-Union Department of Public Health.  This document was available at the
end of the Second World War, 21 December 1945.
56 Ibid.
57 Anon., “Carrier Problem in Eradicating Typhoid: Doctor Blames Small Townships
and Native Hygiene”, Rand Daily Mail, 25 May 1939.  (National Archives of South
Africa (hereafter NASA), NTS 6716, 27/315 II, press cutting.)
58 Anon., “Rural Natives Bring in Enteric”, Rand Daily Mail, 15 August 1938.  (NASA,
NTS 6716, 27/315 I, press cutting.)
59 Anon., “Rural Natives Bring in Enteric”.
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the Public Heath Committee in Cape Town reported no less than 886
cases of typhoid fever (all races) in the city and Langa Township.60   It
seems however, that when outbreaks of typhoid fever occurred, it
seldom if ever reached truly epidemic proportions.  In the 26 years
up to 1939, seven outbreaks occurred in Pretoria, all of them milk-
borne.  There were no waterborne outbreaks in that period and no
outbreak comprised more than 30 cases.61
In Cape Town, Dr Shaddick Higgins, the Medical Health Officer of
Health submitted a report reflecting 85 cases of typhoid fever in April
and May 1943, mostly resulting from consumption of contaminated
milk.62   Other causes reported by the Public Health Committee
included excremental pollution of subsoil water from the Cape Flats,
primitive, unsanitary pail latrines (some people had no latrines at
all), and also from the flies that feasted on the manure from stables in
parts of Cape Town.63  Higgins attributed these problems to poverty
and the social degradation of populations that converged in the city.
He warned that ‘all human pollution has to be regarded as dangerous,’
especially considering that in South Africa, the prevalence of typhoid
fever was due to ‘the use of polluted water supplies for drinking and
domestic purposes.’64   The greatest challenge was that as an insidious
disease, it was difficult to point out visible signs from carriers; hence
prevention became a matter of urgency.
The bold letters of a Rand Daily Mail headline on 15 August 1938
proclaimed typhoid fever by and large as the ‘black man’s disease’ by
stating, with reference to the town of Benoni, that ‘Rural Natives Bring
in Enteric’.65   The same newspaper echoed this view on 25 May 1939
with a headline stating with reference to the city of Pretoria: ‘Carrier
Problem in Eradicating Typhoid: Doctor Blames Small Townships and
Native Hygiene’.66   The 1938 article, quoting an official report of the
Benoni Public Health Department, who referred to typhoid fever as
‘this disease of dirt’ states:
‘Due to infective organisms harbouring in dirt… enteritis will
remain the most serious blot on the public health picture in Benoni
until two problems have been solved among our non-European
60 NASAC, 1/4/7/6/1/1 - 1/4/7//6/1/6, - Public Health Committee Minutes, August
1939 July 1946.
61 Anon., “Carrier Problem in Eradicating Typhoid”.
62 NASAC, 3/CT, 1/4/7/6/1/3, Report on the Outbreak of Enteric Fever in Cape
Town, S. Higgins, 14 June 1943.
63 NASAC, 3/CT, 1/4/7/6/1/3, Report on the Outbreak of Enteric Fever in Cape
Town, S. Higgins, 14 June 1943.
64 NASAC, 3/CT, 1/4/7/6/1/3, Report on the Outbreak of Enteric Fever in Cape
Town, S. Higgins, 14 June 1943.
65 Anon., “Rural Natives Bring in Enteric”.
66 Anon., “Carrier Problem in Eradicating Typhoid”.
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population.  The first is the provision of sanitary housing, which
includes adequate kitchen and pantry facilities as well as a
sufficient and easily available supply of water for domestic
purposes.  The second is the education of the people in the old
rule that cleanliness is next to godliness, which many of the Bantu
have forgotten since they left their rural kraals to dwell in city slums’.67
The 1939 article, quoting Pretoria Medical Health Officer, Dr H.
Nelson, similarly blames the spread of typhoid fever on ‘natives who
have not the same appreciation of cleanliness and hygiene as the
whites’.68   Both articles, however, blame the poor socio-economic
position of black people for their vulnerability to typhoid fever –
absence of waterborne sewage, overcrowding, malnutrition and
inaccessibility of basic health care.  A similar view was held by the
Red Cross, indicating that
typhoid fever attacks people of all races…owing to the unsanitary
conditions under which natives often live the disease is common among
them and they are a source of infection to the rest of the community.69
What the two newspaper articles did not point out was that socio-
economic class and race overlapped almost completely in South
Africa, making typhoid fever ‘the poor man’s disease rather than simply
‘the black man’s disease’.
The Benoni Public Health Department blamed migrant black mine
workers ‘coming from all corners of Southern Africa’, for bringing ‘a
considerable amount of enteric infection from the rural areas’70  to
Benoni.  The Health Department contended that
(M)ine natives mirror the enteric position in the rural population
and so long as the incidence of “carriers” in the country districts
remains high so long will there be many unrecognised “carriers”
entering employment in the mines. 71
This influx of people from the rural areas certainly did not affect the
mining sector only; other sectors of South African society, including
the UDF, also drew workers from those areas.  Nelson claimed, for
example, that ‘all the labour in connection with dairies and foodstuffs
is done by natives’.72   Furthermore, as the Benoni Public Health
Department correctly points out,
(T)hese men [the miners] come into the location [black residential
67 Anon., “Rural Natives Bring in Enteric”.
68 Anon., “Carrier Problem in Eradicating Typhoid”.
69 NASAC, 1/UTA, 6/1/17, 13/3/6 (old no, 13/8/3), South African Red Cross
Society-Union Department of Public Health. This document was available at the
end of the Second World War, 21 December 1945.
70 Anon., “Rural Natives Bring in Enteric”.
71 Ibid.
72 Anon., “Carrier Problem in Eradicating Typhoid”.
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area] and the township at week-ends and associate with the urban
dwellers.73
To kill the health threat at its base, it was
of real importance… that the incidence of enteric fever on the
mines should be reduced as rapidly as possible.74
In his analysis of typhoid fever in Pretoria over the 27 years up to
1939, which was in fact a thesis that he submitted for an M.D. degree
in Dublin, Nelson came to the conclusion, as did the Benoni Public
Health Department that the main cause of the occurrence of typhoid
fever was the carrier.  He too identified blacks as the principal carriers,
stating that ‘on several occasions the source of infection was traced
to a newly employed native carrier handling foodstuffs or utensils’.75
The same desperate socio-economic conditions that caused a
comparatively high incidence of typhoid fever amongst black people
also led to a much higher mortality rate among them than among
white people.  Of 144 cases of typhoid fever treated at the Isolation
Hospital in Pretoria over a two-year period in the late 1930s, 18 (25,7
per cent) of the 70 blacks died, compared to only four (5,4 per cent) of
the 74 whites.76
As pointed out above, typhoid fever is to a large extent a preventable
disease and in the case of Benoni, the incidence rate (all races) was
reduced from 2,54 per thousand of the population in 1936 to 1,03
per thousand in 1937 through prophylactic measures.  The incidence
amongst Europeans had fallen to one-third of the 1936 rate, while
the ‘location native rate’ had been ‘considerably reduced’, but the
‘mine native rate’ proved comparatively slow to fall.
A preventative programme at Van Ryn Deep near Benoni made it
abundantly clear that the best results were obtained if strict attention
was paid to sanitation in addition to inoculation.77   In the case of
Pretoria, Nelson believed that the best way to combat the spread of
typhoid fever was to immunise the entire population, but this was
not practicable, so only contacts were inoculated.78   This was, of
course, also the case in of the rest of the country.
Whenever certain conditions or individuals are perceived to be
endangering the health of society at large, public authorities have
an obligation to act preventatively.  Since it was not possible to
73 Anon., “Rural Natives Bring in Enteric”.
74 Ibid.
75 Anon., “Carrier Problem in Eradicating Typhoid”.
76 Ibid.
77 Anon., “Rural Natives Bring in Enteric”.
78 Anon., “Carrier Problem in Eradicating Typhoid”.
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immunise the entire population and it was determined that the main
cause of the occurrence of typhoid fever was the carrier, it follows
logically that the alternative to an all-inclusive immunisation
programme was to find and neutralise the carriers.79   Having identified
black mine workers as the carriers, the Benoni Public Health
Department consequently emphasised that ‘the incidence of enteric
fever on the mines should be reduced as rapidly as possible’.80
The South African military soon bought into the idea of finding and
neutralising typhoid carriers.  Carriers were sometimes found in the
course of the examination (blood testing) of black people engaged in
the handling of food in the kitchens and messes of the UDF.  The
normal procedure in such cases was to discharge such individuals
or transfer them to other jobs.  The problem was that those of them
that were so-called ‘trained kitchen boys’ would often take their
discharge and find employment elsewhere in the food industry.81   In
order to neutralise that possible source of infection, the Deputy
Assistant Director of Medical Services, UDF suggested to the Native
Commissioner in June 1941 that
… the passes of boys who may not act as foodhandlers, be so
endorsed, and that this endorsement be transferred to new passes
when issued.82
No mention was made of identifying and dealing with white carriers,
endorsing the notion that it was ‘the black man’s disease’.
The Secretary for Native Affairs, however, discarded the idea of
endorsing the passes of carriers identified through blood testing.  His
argument was that it was futile since only ‘a few’ carriers of typhoid
fever (approximately two per cent of those tested by the military
authorities) where dealt with by the UDF, ‘whilst hundreds of other
cases never come to light.’83 Furthermore, the Secretary for Native
Affairs contended, if the ‘positive’ blood tests were not followed up
with further, complicated tests, there was a possibility that people
who were not actually carriers of the disease could be ‘stigmatised’
and if passes were to be endorsed accordingly, ‘injustices might be created
and the Department [could be] involved in legal actions’.84   Fear for the
79 Ibid.
80 Anon., “Rural Natives Bring in Enteric”.
81 NASA, NTS 6716, 27/315, Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services - Native
Commissioner, 4 June 1941.
82 NASA, NTS 6716, 27/315, Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services - Native
Commissioner, 4 June 1941.
83 NASA, NTS 6716, 27/315, Secretary for Native Affairs - Native Commissioner, 17
July 1941.
84 NASA, NTS 6716, 27/315, Secretary for Native Affairs - Native Commissioner, 17
July 1941.
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infringement of human rights thus informed the Secretary for Native
Affairs’ decision to discard the proposed pass endorsement system.
Drastic and discriminatory as the military’s proposed pass endorsement
system would have been, it was not without precedent in public health
authorities’ dilemma in trying to protect the public’s health against
individual carriers of disease while at the same time preserving the civil
liberties of such individuals. The most well-known example of this is
probably the case of the Mary Mallon, alias ‘Typhoid Mary’, who was
identified as a healthy carrier of typhoid fever in the USA in 1904 and
detained for life to prevent her from endangering public health.  It was
calculated that she infected no less than 47 – 51 people directly with
the typhoid bacteria, three of whom died.  This was, however, just the tip
of the iceberg, as she infected scores of people indirectly as well.85
The construction of the Berg River-Saldanha Bay water pipeline
One of the many military projects on which black workers were
employed inside the Union of South Africa was the construction of
the Berg River-Saldanha Bay water pipeline in 1942/3.  This project
was in fact the culmination of the vision and dreams of theorists,
planners, developers and others over no less than three centuries.
European seafarers recognised Saldanha Bay as one of the best natural
harbours in the world even before the Dutch refreshment station was
established at the Cape in 1652.  The British, when they occupied
the Cape almost one and a half centuries after the Dutch arrival, saw
great potential in Saldanha Bay as a naval base, but never exploited
it.  The principal reason for this lack of development was the absence
of a sustainable supply of fresh water.  The prospect of diverting water
from the nearby Berg River to Saldanha Bay had been contemplated
ever since the Dutch settlement, but only came to fruition in the
mid-twentieth century when, during the Second World War, military
necessity forced the Union government into action.  Italy’s entry into
the Second World War in June 1940 made the Mediterranean
85 Mary Mallon was the first person in the United States of America to be recognised
as a healthy carrier of typhoid fever and was identified as such during an epidemic
that spread through parts of New York City in 1904.  She worked as a cook in the
homes of New York City’s elite between 1900 and 1915, moving from household
to household.  Mary was eventually forcibly detained for life in a small bungalow
at an isolation hospital on North Brother Island in the East River.  (J.W. Leavitt,
Typhoid Mary: Captive to the Public’s Health (Beacon Press, Boston, 1996), pp xvii-
xviii, 1-8, 14-21, 255; Encyclopædia Britannica, “Typhoid Mary”, Encyclopaedia
Britannica 2008 Ultimate Reference Suite (Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, 2009);
Anon., “Mary Mallon, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Mallon, accessed 13
December 2007; J. Rosenberg, “Typhoid Mary”, http://history1900s.about.com/
od/1900s/a/typhoidmary.htm, accessed 13 December 2007.)
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extremely unsafe for Allied shipping, with the result that Allied supply
ships serving the Middle East theatre were compelled to sail around
the Cape to the Red Sea.  The tremendous increase in traffic along
the South African coast completely saturated the Union ports,
particularly Table Bay (Cape Town).  The South African Government, in
consultation with Great Britain, consequently decided in 1941 to build
an additional port at Saldanha Bay to relief the pressure on Table Bay.86
Figure 1: The Berg River-Saldanha Bay water pipeline, 1942/1943.87
86 See G.E. Visser, J.A. Jacobs and H.A.P. Smit, “Water for Saldanha: War as an
agent of change”, Historia, Vol. 53, No 1, May 2008, pp. 130-61.
87 G.E. Visser, J.A. Jacobs and H.A.P. Smit, “Water for Saldanha: War as an Agent
of Change”, p. 145.
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The military activities at Saldanha put severe pressure on the town’s
meagre water supplies.  This was bound to become even worse if
Saldanha Bay became a convoy assembly point, as the British
envisaged (and as had actually happened in January 1943), when
an even larger number of ships would have had to be supplied with
fresh water.  The Union Government therefore, by June 1942, granted
the Department of Defence permission and funding to lay a 55
kilometres (km) long pipeline (see figure 1), interspaced with storage
reservoirs at various points, from the Berg River to bring an estimated
4 550 000 litres (l) of fresh water per day to Saldanha Bay.88
No. 15 Field Company, South African Engineers Corps (eight officers
and 85 men) under the command of Capt. J.M. Stacey, subsequently
succeeded by Maj. W.R.F. Connell, was summoned from Sonderwater
north of Pretoria to Saldanha to construct the Berg River water works,
pipeline and reservoirs.  The construction of the water works at the
intake site and the commencement of the pipeline from that end were
entrusted to No. 2 Section (one officer and 21 men) under Lt. G.J. M.
Kirk (later succeeded by Capt. J.C.G. du Toit), who pitched camp at
the Berg River intake site, about one and a half kilometres upstream
from Berg River Station on the farm Jantjesfontein, on 11 August
1942.  The remainder of No. 15 Field Company carried out various other
engineer missions in the Saldanha Bay area, including constructing
intermediate storage reservoirs along the course of the pipeline.89
Although a mechanical shovel was brought by train from Cape Town
to Berg River Station to excavate the settling tanks and filter beds at
the intake, most of the excavation work on the pipeline had to be
done manually.  A contingent of 49 black workers (‘unattested black
labourers’) under a white overseer thus joined the engineer section
at the Berg River intake site.  The total number of black workers
employed on the pipeline was initially 172, but more workers started
arriving towards the end of September, pushing their numbers up to
616 by 9 October.90   Some of these black workers were recruited in
the Transkei, whilst others were later taken on, inter alia, from the
Langa Township on the outskirts of Cape Town.91   These
predominantly black areas were prejudiced in terms of the prevalence
of typhoid fever and the apparent ‘indifference’ of the public heath
Visser , Monama
88 G.E. Visser, J.A. Jacobs and H.A.P. Smit, “Water for Saldanha: War as an Agent
of Change”.
89 G.E. Visser, J.A. Jacobs and H.A.P. Smit, “Water for Saldanha: War as an Agent
of Change”.
90 South African National Defence Force Archives (hereafter SANDFA), WD 127,
War Diary 15th Field Coy. SAEC, 1-31 October 1942, report by J.M. Stacy for
week ended 9 October 1942.
91 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public Health, 7
June 1943.
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authorities to the plight of blacks living there.
Dr G. H. Gunn, medical officer of Health Department in Durban wrote
disparagingly in the Daily Dispatch of 1944 that East London’s
‘incidence of typhoid fever amongst non-European population’ was
at 900 per cent as compared to Pietermaritzburg which stood at 300
per cent by 1943.92   The East London Public Health authorities
dismissed these figures and indicated that from 1938-1943, 103
cases were reported.93   Between 1940 and 1943, the Magistrate of Umtata,
E.F. Owen, was notified regularly about incidence of between two to five
cases monthly of the disease and advised to facilitate the ‘cleaning up
and disinfection of abode and surroundings’ in his district.94   The Public
Health Committee reports also referred to Langa Township frequently
in connection with the occurrence of cases of typhoid fever.
The engineers surveyed and pegged the course of the pipeline
between the Berg River and Saldanha Bay and pitched a number of
intermediate camps at various intervals along the route in order to
carry on with the construction work at several places simultaneously.
The construction teams then commenced with the backbreaking
excavation of the trench, the laying of the 305-mm (12-inch) piping
and the construction of the water works and intermediate storage
reservoirs under the blistering summer sun of the Western Cape.  The
mechanical shovel helped a lot, but it broke down frequently, forcing
the construction teams to fall back on manual labour alone.  The
initial acute shortage of workers slowed the construction down, but
the construction teams made reasonable progress from late
September when the additional workers started joining the
construction teams.95
On 14 October 1942 Capt. J.M. Stacey, commanding officer of No. 15
Field Company, SAEC, received instructions from the Chief Fortress
Engineer, Cape Fortress to suspend all non-essential works and to
speed up the work on the Saldanha Bay water scheme.  No. 1 Section
of No. 15 Field Company, SAEC, was subsequently transferred from
Saldanha Bay to the intake site to increase the workforce.  Despite
the fact that his black workforce had risen to 729 – inter alia through
the recruitment of 94 men in the black township of Langa near Cape
Town on 5 November – Maj. Connell reported that a shortage of workers
was hampering his progress considerably when he had to negotiate a
92 NASAC, 3/ELN, 2004, Outbreak of Typhoid Fever at Duncan Village, Typhus
Epidemic in the Transkei, 11 April 1944.
93 Ibid.
94 NASAC, 1/UTA, 6/1/17, 13/3/6, Outbreak of Typhoid in Gwaqana, Manqondo
Location, Mqanduli, Zueque Location, Transkei, August 1943.
95 G.E. Visser, J.A. Jacobs and H.A.P. Smit, “Water for Saldanha: War as an agent
of change”.
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limestone layer over a distance of almost one kilometre north of the
main road to Vredenburg in early November.  At one stage, the
construction teams had to work 24-hour shifts with the only two
jackhammers available.  By the end of November, he consequently
asked for an additional 200 workers to speed up the excavation work
and complained that the non-delivery of more jackhammers was
delaying his work.  More workers were indeed recruited during the
next month or two because of his plea, bringing the total to 1 20096
by May/June 1943.  Connell succeeded in making good progress
despite all the difficulties and the first water from the Berg River
pipeline reached Saldanha Bay on 7 February 1943.97
The outbreak of typhoid fever at the Berg River intake
site
The accommodation of the black workers at these camps illustrated
how South Africa’s racial policies not only barred black people from
enlisting for combat service, but also exposed them to adverse
conditions in the workplace, particularly with regard to living
conditions.  At the intake site on the Berg River, the whites lived
comfortably in the farm buildings on the site.  Elsewhere wartime
pressure on resources rendered the accommodation of the engineers
somewhat less than spectacular.  According to an entry in No. 15
Field Company’s war diary on 13 September 1942, they constructed
officers’ quarters, a hut for the Company Sergeant-major and a
bungalow for the men at Saldanha Bay from ‘aeroplane packing
cases’.98   The black workers, in sharp contrast, were housed in
rudimentary inverted V-shaped galvanised corrugated iron shelters
or lean-tos, 2,75 x 2,5 metres (9 ft. x 8 ft.) in size, without any
ventilation.  With room to house no more than four men with any
comfort, it was customary to put six persons in such a shelter.  Acting
Native Commissioner, A.A. Burge, expressed doubt that the military
authorities had consulted a medical officer when these buildings
were put up.99
By May 1943, there were 380 black workers at the intake site on the
Berg River, with 64 shelters erected for them.  Though that was
sufficient to accommodate the men at the customary ratio of six per
shelter, Burge found no less than nine living in one shelter, whether
96 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public Health, 7
June 1943.
97 G.E. Visser, J.A. Jacobs and H.A.P. Smit, “Water for Saldanha: War as an agent
of change”.
98 SANDFA, WD 127, War Diary 15th Field Coy. SAEC, 13 September 1943.
99 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, A.A. Burge - Director of Native Labour, 2 June
1943; ibid., anon., handwritten note on letter, 17 June 1943.
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by choice or force.100   Both summer heat and winter cold rendered
this primitive accommodation unpleasant and inconvenient, but,
more seriously, these overcrowded living conditions were not
conducive to good health, particularly with a view to the threat of
typhoid fever.  The workers obtained their drinking water from the
river, but it was treated with ammonia and chlorine by means of a
portable unit before consumption.  They were, however, washing and
swimming in the polluted water on a daily basis.101   These activities
were indeed creating a time bomb, since the Cape Circle Engineer,
E. Fincham, reported as early as February 1938 that the Public Health
Department had warned him
not to drink the [Berg] river water or bathe in it as it was “extremely
dangerous”… [since] enteric [fever] is rife from Wellington right to
the sea… [and the] Berg River water is now “a menace to public
health”.102
On 25 March 1938 the acting Cape Circle Engineer, furthermore,
reported that typhoid fever was ‘almost endemic’103  at the little
settlement of Velddrift near the Berg River mouth with its 1 600
European and 300 ‘coloured’ inhabitants and suggested that the
Public Health Department, the local Divisional Council and other
government departments concerned should pay attention to this
health threat.104
Normally the military authorities paid due attention to health issues
based upon medical intelligence that preceded the deployment of
forces.  The 61st Tunnelling Company, the black unit attached to the
South African Engineer Corps (SAEC) to serve in the tunnel
construction on the Haifa–Beirut–Tripoli railway and on the Kasmieh
(Lebanon) irrigation scheme, for example, though exposed to
hazardous conditions, benefited from an hygiene section that
provided medical support to all personnel, including civilian
labourers.105   Surprisingly the military authorities did not follow up
the information on the prevalence of typhoid fever on the Berg River
and put no proper medical countermeasures in place when the
construction of the pipeline commenced.  The Department of Native
Affairs, who was primarily responsible for the welfare of all black
100 Ibid.
101 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public
Health, 7 June 1943.
102 SANDFA, DC 3395, DC2305/51/2 I, Circle Engineer, Cape Circle - Director
of Irrigation, 24 February 1938.
103 SANDFA, DC 3395, DC2305/51/2, I, Acting Circle Engineer, Cape Circle -
Director of Irrigation, 25 March 1938.
104 Ibid.
105 SANDFA, UWH (Civil) 166, Narep-Unfo 21, SAEC: 61 Tunnelling Coy, 1941-
1944 (Syria, Lebanon, Italy), August 1943.
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workers in government employ, did not see to it that the military
authorities make adequate arrangements with regard to the health
care of the workers at the Berg River camp.  The military authorities
did not test the cooks preparing their meals in the on-site camp
kitchen to determine if they were carriers of typhoid fever or other
diseases.  The district surgeon at Vredenburg, Dr C. Rauch, and the
medical officer at Saldanha, one Capt Comay, furthermore, carried
out the examination and general medical care of the workers on a
voluntary basis.  This was an unsatisfactory arrangement with a view
to the fact that the state was contract-bound to provide free medical
services to their unattested black workers.  Furthermore, the UDF
informed the workers recruited from Langa that they would get free
food and accommodation in addition to their wages, but no mention
was made of medical treatment.106
The riparian dwellers, who were more sensitive to the health risk on
their doorstep than the military authorities, were not happy with the
presence and behaviour of the construction workers at the Berg River
intake site at Jantjesfontein.  On 20 January 1943 Hein Wicht, owner
of the adjoining farm, warned the Secretary for Defence that there
was ‘a serious danger of the river becoming contaminated… [since]
large numbers of natives were bathing and washing clothes in the
river… [and] traces of crude sewage [was found] stranded on my
frontage.107   Given Fincham’s above-mentioned report of 1938,
chances are that the river was already contaminated when the workers
arrived there.  Be that as it may, the Acting Director of Fortifications
and Coastal Works in Cape Town promised that the bathing and
washing would be stopped.  A concerned and annoyed Wicht,
however, complained on 7 May that these activities were
continuing.108
On 13 May, less than a week after Wicht’s second letter of complaint,
six of the workers at the intake site reported sick, whilst a seventh
who also fell ill proceeded directly to Cape Town.  All of them were
diagnosed with typhoid fever, as was an eighth individual who fell ill
on 22 May.  One of the original seven was admitted to Malmesbury
Hospital, while two were sent to the City Infectious Diseases Hospital
in Cape Town.  The rest were treated in a sickbay at the camp, where
the district surgeon and a medical orderly attended to them.  This
intervention saved six of the eight, but two unfortunately did not
106 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public
Health, 7 June 1943.
107 SANDFA, DC 3395, DC2305/51/2 I, H. Wicht - Secretary for Defence, 20
January 1943.




survive.  Tests indicated that the workers’ drinking water was not
contaminated and the health authorities concluded that the workers
were probably infected by swimming and washing in the river.  The
health authorities suspected that the infection occurred during the
Easter weekend at the end of April when there was more opportunity
for swimming and when there were consequently more people in the
water.109
Martin Melck, the riparian farmer on whose property the pumping
station was built, wrote on 26 May 1943 that he had learned with
‘great alarm’ of the ‘highly dangerous and infectious disease… [that
had] broken out among the natives’ and expressed the hope ‘that every
step is being taken to prevent [the] infection spreading’.110   He
complained, as he had done before, according to his letter, about
the slackness of control of these natives…[who] are always found
all over my property and also here at the main homestead after
dark which is very much against my wishes and requests to the
O.C. [Officer Commanding] in charge.111
He furthermore stated that the workers ‘still are not compelled to use
a proper lavatory but litter the veld with their offal’ and stated that he
‘much fear[ed] the safety of… [his] “boys” as they have to use the
river water especially in this very much delayed rainy season’.112
Part of Melck and his fellow farmers’ dissatisfaction and annoyance
with the construction workers perhaps resulted from prejudice.  The
Magistrate at the nearby town of Hopefield remarked in a letter to the
Secretary for Native Affairs in March 1944 when farmers in that area
complained about ‘a large number of unemployed natives lying about
on… [their] farms’ that
‘farmers and others… in this part of the country are not used to
natives and do not understand them, but insist on regarding them
all as thieves and murderers’.113
The Acting Director of Fortifications and Coastal Works claimed, in
response to Melck’s complaints, to have given ‘strict instructions…
to the parties concerned to rectify this matter, but that owing to… the
breakdown of certain pumping equipment it is evident that the natives
109 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public
Health, 7 June 1943.
110 SANDFA, QMG (Gp 19) 155, DC(E)671/2/101 I, M. Melck - Secretary for
Defence, 26 May 1943.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, Magistrate Hopefield - Secretary for Native
Affairs, 31 March 1944.
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again went down to bathe and wash in the river’.114   After they had
repaired the pumping equipment, the military authorities commenced
putting up a fence to prevent what they called ‘a recurrence of the
nuisance’.115
Having received a report from the district surgeon, Dr Rauch, about
the eight men that came down with typhoid fever at the Berg River
intake site, Dr J.J. du Pre le Roux of the Union Health Department in
Cape Town, accompanied by military hygiene officer Maj. R.E. Meaker
and Acting Native Commissioner, A.A. Burge, rushed to the scene
in view of the fact that the water from this source was being
supplied to shipping at Saldanha Bay.116
The main concern thus seems to have been not for the good health of
the workers in the first place, but rather about preventing
contamination of the water supply to Saldanha Bay to avert possible
infection of the thousands of soldiers, sailors and civilian personnel
on board the Allied ships replenishing their water supply at Saldanha.
The Berg river water was, of course, treated with chlorine at the intake
at Jantjesfontein before it entered the pipeline to Saldanha Bay.  A
sample of the main water supply taken at Saldanha after the outbreak
confirmed, fortunately, that the water in the pipeline was not
contaminated.  The public health authorities at the same time, rather
belatedly, made arrangements for the main water supply to be tested
on a weekly basis henceforth.117
Acting Native Commissioner A. A. Burge reported the primitive,
overcrowded living conditions of the workers at the intake site to the
Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg as he ‘may wish to take
the matter up with the Military Authorities’.118   The latter forwarded
Burge’s letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs in Pretoria for ‘any
action you may consider necessary’.119   The Secretary for Native Affairs
expressed concern that there was ‘another much bigger camp in
Saldanha where numbers are growing… [where] the housing should
also be watched’.120   He suggested that all ‘native camps’ in the
114 SANDFA, DC 3395, DC2305/51/2 I, Acting Director of Fortifications and
Coastal Works (Cape) - Secretary for Defence, 24 May 1943.
115 Ibid.
116 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public
Health, 7 June 1943.
117 Ibid.
118 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, A.A. Burge - Director of Native Labour, 2 June
1943.
119 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, Acting Director of Native Labour – Secretary for
Native Affairs, 14 June 1943.
120 Ibid, anon. handwritten note on letter.
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Saldanha area should be inspected by a hygiene officer.121   Besides
the total of 1 200 workers employed on the pipeline, a further 800
blacks were employed by civilian contractors working for the
Department of Defence at Saldanha Bay,122  which brought the total
number of black workers in the Saldanha area to about 2 000 and
increased the threat of an outbreak of typhoid fever.
The military and public health authorities succeeded in containing
the outbreak of typhoid fever at the intake at Jantjesfontein and
preventing it from reaching epidemic proportions.  The Acting Director
of Fortifications and Coastal Works reported to the Secretary for
Defence on 9 June 1943 that
(T)he position is under control and… all natives have been
inoculated [with typhoid endotozoid123 ] and any recruits coming to
the area are also inoculated’.124
Mother Nature had in the meantime also made a contribution to
remedy the health situation, for by early June ‘the very much delayed
rainy season’125  had finally arrived and the Berg River was ‘flowing
fairly rapidly’126 , which reduced the risk of contamination.
Though there were no further occurrences of typhoid fever at the Berg
River camp, many more cases were reported in Cape Town (the total
for the period September 1943-August 1945 was 475 cases),127  which
was of great concern to the UDF since they recruited some of their
workers in the Saldanha Bay area from the black residential areas
around the city.128   Apart from new recruits coming in, these workers
presumably went home during weekends and on vacation leave from
time to time, which created the opportunity for infection and made
protective inoculation of both serving workers and new arrivals
imperative.  In addition, there was also an influx of black people from
Cape Town into Saldanha Bay as the construction work in the Cape
Peninsula was completed and workers made their way to Saldanha
to find new employment and were taken on by contractors when they
121 Ibid.
122 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public Health,
7 June 1943.
123 Ibid.
124 SANDFA, DC 3395, DC2305/51/2 I, Acting Director of Fortifications and Coastal
Works (Cape) - Secretary for Defence, 9 June 1943.
125 SANDFA, QMG (Gp 19) 155, DC(E)671/2/101 I, M. Melck - Secretary for Defence,
26 May 1943.
126 SANDFA, QMG (Gp 19) 155, DC(E)671/2/101 I, Acting Director of Fortifications
and Coastal Works (Cape) - Secretary for Defence, 9 June 1943.
127 NASAC, 3/CT, 1/4/7/6/1/3 – 3/CT, 1/4/7//6/1/5, Monthly Health Reports,
Public Health Committee Minutes, September 1943-August 1945.
128 SANDFA, DC 3395, DC2305/51/2 I, Acting Director of Fortifications and Coastal
Works (Cape) - Secretary for Defence, 9 June 1943.
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required additional labour.129
The Acting Director of Fortifications and Coastal Works in Cape Town
assured the Secretary for Defence shortly after the outbreak of typhoid
fever at the Berg River pumping station that ‘suitable latrines and
ablutions are in existence in their [the workers’] camp area, and strict
instructions against fouling of the bush and washing in the river are
being complied with’.130
He stated, in response to Melck’s above-mentioned complaints, that
‘every endeavour is being made to control these natives’131  but pointed
out that it was very difficult to prevent them from wandering onto
adjoining properties after working hours.132
The voluntary medical services rendered to the black workers
involved in the construction of the Berg River pipeline by the district
surgeon, Dr C. Rauch, and the medical officer at Saldanha, Capt
Comay, was in the meantime discontinued at the end of May 1943.133
The Acting Director of Native Labour, who appreciated that standard
conditions with regard to accommodation could not always be
maintained in wartime, stressed that ‘the same latitude should not
be permitted in respect of medical attention’134  and urged the military
authorities to make proper arrangements in that regard.  In early
July 1943 the Secretary for Native Affairs, through the Acting Native
Commissioner, stressed to the Director of Fortifications in Cape Town
that the accommodation of the black workers in the Saldanha Bay
area was ‘by no means satisfactory’ due to overcrowding, a lack of
proper ventilation and inadequate provision for ablution and pushed
for appropriate steps to be taken to remedy the situation.135
The military engineers soon after wrapped up construction of the
pipeline, but hundreds of black workers were still employed in
Saldanha Bay and at Langebaan Road, where an aerodrome was being
built.  The military authorities now assumed overall responsibility
for the accommodation and medical arrangements of all black
129 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public Health,
7 June 1943.
130 SANDFA, DC 3395, DC2305/51/2 I, Acting Director of Fortifications and Coastal
Works (Cape) - Secretary for Defence, 9 June 1943.
131 SANDFA, DC 3395, DC2305/51/2 I, Acting Director of Fortifications and Coastal
Works (Cape) - Secretary for Defence, 9 June 1943.
132 Ibid.
133 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, J.J. du Pre le Roux - Secretary for Public
Health, 7 June 1943.
134 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, Acting Director of Native Labour - Secretary for
Native Affairs, 18 June 1943.
135 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, Acting Native Commissioner - Director of
Fortifications, 6 July 1943.
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workers, both those in the employ of the UDF and those working for
contractors engaged in construction work for the UDF in the Saldanha
Bay area and tightened up these services effectively.136   With the end
of the Second World War in 1945 the wartime military activities
gradually died down, most of the military personnel and black workers
who had flocked to the Saldanha Bay area during the war departed
and the wartime health challenges posed by the influx of people,
overcrowding and the saturation of social services disappeared.
Conclusion
Racial discrimination embedded in the South African Defence Act and
limited employment opportunities forced thousands of black men into
the service of the UDF as civilian workers during the Second World
War.  These workers were vulnerable to health threats such as typhoid
fever due to their poor socio-economic background and the
unsatisfactory living conditions to which they were subjected in the
work situation under wartime pressure.  Negligence and sloppy health
management on the part of the UDF and the public health authorities
aggravated this.  The threat of typhoid fever on the Berg River was
well-known to them when the military engineers commenced the
construction of the Berg River pipeline, yet they failed to take proper
precautions against possible infections.  Even when the riparian
dwellers warned the military authorities of the health risk created by
the large numbers of workers bathing and washing their clothes in
the river and the presence of crude sewage in the river, they took no
effective protective steps.
The subsequent outbreak of typhoid fever could potentially have
reached epidemic proportions, threatening not only the life of
hundreds of black workers along the Berg River pipeline, but also
the life of thousands of soldiers, sailors and others in Saldanha Bay
and on the large number of ships replenishing their water supplies
in the Bay.  From that perspective, the sloppiness of the military
authorities with regard to hygiene and health care on the Berg River
could theoretically have dealt the Allied war effort a serious blow.
Fortunately, the outbreak was contained through the belated
introduction of precautionary inoculation and a potential disaster
was averted.
Appropriate medical intelligence normally precedes the deployment
of armed forces to reduce the risks of contracting and spreading deadly
136 NASA, NTS 9843, 56/408B, Acting Director Medical Services Cape Fortress-
Deputy Chief Health Officer, 14 November 1943.
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diseases.  However, the outbreak of typhoid fever at the Berg River
intake site proved that even an abundance of prior knowledge and
early warning do not always translate into appropriate action on the
part of the controlling authorities.  The potentially disastrous
situation, from both a health and an operational perspective, created
through negligence on the Berg River during the Second World War
should serve as a warning to the South African National Defence Force
when deploying on peace support operations on the African
continent: HIV/Aids might be the number one killer disease of our
day, but typhoid fever, though defeated in medical terms, will rear its
deadly head whenever preventative measures are neglected.
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